- US–Pakistan ties are strengthening due to Washington’s need for antimony and Pakistan’s search for defence and financial support beyond China, creating a more stable and mutually beneficial partnership.
- This renewed alignment could erode India’s qualitative military edge, especially if it leads to fresh US missile or air-defence support for Islamabad.
- For India, the long-term risk is strategic, not immediate: a Pakistan with diversified external backers—US and China—becomes more resilient, more assertive, and harder to deter.
The renewed strategic opening between the United States and Pakistan—driven by Washington’s urgent need for antimony and other critical minerals, and Islamabad’s search for defence and financial support beyond China—stands out as one of the most consequential developments in South Asian security in 2025. Beneath the surface of commercial and mining agreements lies a trajectory with long-term implications for regional deterrence and strategic stability.
Why Washington Is Turning Back to Pakistan
The core driver is industrial and military necessity. US ammunition production requires military-grade antimony trisulfide, at a time when supply chains for this material are overwhelmingly dominated by China, which controls 85% of global reserves.
Recent reports of substantial antimony deposits in Pakistan’s Balochistan—facilitated by the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Bill passed in March and corroborated by US geological surveys dating back to 1975—provide Washington with an immediate alternative. The $43.4 million extraction contract awarded on 30 September fits into a broader push, with more than $850 million invested under the Defense Production Act since the start of FY2025.
For Pakistan, the incentives are equally clear: access to capital, international recognition, and, crucially, renewed access to advanced US defence systems—an area where Chinese supplies have not always met operational requirements.
The Military Dimension: Signals India Cannot Ignore
Official US communications have sought to frame the AMRAAM contract modification, which adds Pakistan back to the list of potential purchasers, as an administrative adjustment. But the underlying reality remains: the United States is not ruling out new missile sales, and even “non-enhancing” transfers can have meaningful operational effects in the India-Pakistan context.
The sequence of events—including two visits to Washington by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir, an unprecedented meeting with President Trump, the presentation of rare-earth samples in the Oval Office, the announcement of joint oil development, and MoUs between US Strategic Metals and Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization—suggests a deeper convergence than official statements imply.
Following its recent confrontation with India, Pakistan faces visible gaps in its air defence capabilities, most of which rely on Chinese platforms. Islamabad is likely to view the renewed US connection as an opportunity to upgrade selected systems. Recent US sales of advanced tactical air defence systems to Egypt and Saudi Arabia show that such transfers are both technically and politically feasible.
Implications for India
From New Delhi’s perspective, the emerging dynamic raises three key concerns:
1. Erosion of India’s qualitative edge: Over the last decade, the Indian Air Force has built a notable technological and doctrinal advantage over Pakistan. Even limited US military transfers—missiles, sensors, or air-defence assets—could narrow this margin. The issue is not any single sale but the direction of travel: a Pakistan that re-integrates US equipment rather than relying almost exclusively on China becomes more resilient and harder to deter.
2. A less China-dependent Pakistan is more unpredictable: For India, a diversification of Pakistan’s strategic dependencies is not an automatic win. A tripolar relationship—US-Pakistan-China—gives Islamabad more room to manoeuvre, especially on cross-border militancy or limited military escalation. Historically, Pakistan acts more assertively when it has multiple external patrons.
3. The re-emergence of US “strategic ambiguity”: The US-India partnership has deepened significantly, driven by shared concerns about China. But historically, Washington has approached Pakistan through a transactional logic. A renewed US-Pakistan engagement, even if tactical and resource-driven, complicates India’s strategic calculus—particularly at a time when New Delhi is expanding its role in the Gulf, the Indo-Pacific and Western supply chains.
In short, this is less about a weakening of US-India ties and more about the need for India to assess whether Washington is edging toward a more balanced regional posture.
The Balochistan Factor
Another layer of complexity stems from the US decision to designate the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a terrorist organisation on 11 August.
The timing—coinciding with the mining agreements and top-level Pakistani visits—suggests a converging interest in stabilising Balochistan, a region with direct implications for China’s CPEC and indirect relevance for India.
For New Delhi, this could entail: increased militarisation of Balochistan; shrinking political space for Baloch nationalist movements; an overall strengthening of Pakistan’s internal security apparatus.
A Shifting Balance
The emerging US-Pakistan relationship is entering a new phase, anchored in critical minerals and selective military cooperation. For India, the concern is not an immediate qualitative leap in Pakistan’s capabilities, but the gradual consolidation of a more stable, better-resourced Islamabad with diversified external partnerships.
In the short term, Washington will likely attempt to maintain a formal balance between India and Pakistan.
In the longer term, however, the combination of supply-chain imperatives, defence cooperation, and renewed strategic relevance could reshape deterrence in South Asia.
For India, the challenge is twofold: to deepen cooperation with the US in defence and emerging technologies, while preparing for a scenario in which Washington once again views Pakistan as a functional—if not privileged—partner.
