- Operational tempo up across the board: Beijing intensified military activity around Taiwan, in the South China Sea, near Japan, and beyond the First Island Chain.
- Taiwan remains the core pressure point: Record air and naval incursions, plus large-scale blockade-style exercises, signal sustained coercive pressure.
- Blue-water ambitions accelerating: Chinese carrier groups operated farther and longer in the Pacific, while joint drills with Russia declined in number but grew in sophistication.
A new report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), titled “Tracking China’s Increased Military Activities in the Indo-Pacific in 2025” and authored by Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Leon Li, and Truly Tinsley, offers a data-driven snapshot of a clear trend: China is not merely modernizing its military—it is expanding its operational reach and normalizing higher levels of activity across the Indo-Pacific.
Taiwan: A New Baseline of Pressure
The Taiwan Strait remains the epicenter of Chinese military activity. In 2025, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted 3,764 air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), a 22.4 percent increase over 2024. More important than the raw number is the structural shift: since May 2024, following President William Lai’s inauguration, Chinese activity has settled into a permanently elevated baseline. Monthly incursions no longer dip below previous lows, signaling a recalibrated “new normal.”
Two major exercises—Strait Thunder-2025A and Justice Mission 2025—simulated encirclement and blockade scenarios around Taiwan, extending drills into waters closer to the island than in previous years. A slight slowdown in the latter part of 2025 appears tactical rather than strategic, likely reflecting adjustments tied to U.S.-China-Taiwan dynamics.
South China Sea: Record Activity, Shifted Focus
In the South China Sea, the PLA conducted a record 163 publicly reported operations in 2025, including 55 live-fire drills. China’s coercive pressure on the Philippines continued, but the geographic focus shifted from Second Thomas Shoal to Scarborough Shoal, where China Coast Guard (CCG) presence more than doubled year-on-year.
The pattern suggests a calibrated approach: persistent gray-zone pressure combined with episodic escalations, especially during sensitive political or military developments involving Manila and Washington.
Japan and the East China Sea: Escalation Signals
Tensions with Japan also intensified. After remarks by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi linking a Taiwan contingency to Japan’s security, Beijing responded with diplomatic protests and a wave of military demonstrations.
Chinese naval vessels increased their presence near Japan, and China maintained record-high coast guard operations in the contiguous zone around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Notably, in December, Chinese jets launched from the aircraft carrier Liaoning locked radar on Japanese aircraft—an unmistakable show of force.
Beyond the First Island Chain: Blue-Water Normalization
Perhaps the most consequential shift is geographic. In 2025, China’s navy significantly expanded far-seas training. The aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong operated beyond the First Island Chain for nearly twice as many days as in 2024—and for the first time conducted simultaneous carrier operations in the Pacific.
Chinese task groups sailed near Australia and New Zealand, conducting live-fire drills with minimal notice. These activities underscore Beijing’s steady transition toward a blue-water navy capable of sustained power projection.
China-Russia: Fewer Drills, Deeper Complexity
Joint exercises with Russia declined sharply—six in 2025 compared to fourteen in 2024. Yet qualitative developments stood out, including the first joint submarine patrol. The message: cooperation may be less frequent, but it is evolving.
Bottom line: The report’s core conclusion is not just that China is doing more—but that it is operating differently. Higher baselines, broader geography, and more sophisticated signaling point to a military posture that is increasingly routinized, outward-looking, and strategically confident across the Indo-Pacific.
