Over the past months, one trend has drawn increasing attention among military observers in Asia: the sharp drop in aircraft sorties by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Taiwan. On some recent days the number of detected flights has fallen to nearly zero, prompting a wave of interpretations. Some analysts have suggested that Beijing may be trying to lower tensions ahead of a possible meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. Others have pointed to the recent purges within China’s military leadership as a possible factor affecting operational readiness.
A closer look at the available data, however, suggests a different explanation. The decline in air activity may be linked primarily to a new phase in the PLA’s military training reform, a long-term process launched by Xi Jinping and still unfolding.
A reform process years in the making
The transformation of the PLA’s training system did not begin recently. Following the sweeping organizational reforms implemented between 2015 and 2016, Xi Jinping announced in November 2020 a new round of reforms focused specifically on military training.
The reform roadmap envisioned a sequential process moving through three stages:
- Basic training reform
- Combined-arms training
- Full joint training across services
Over the following years the PLA held several key conferences aimed at consolidating each stage. In June 2023, an onsite conference focused on basic training, while another meeting in October 2024 addressed combined-arms training. Such conferences are important signals: they suggest that the PLA leadership believes it has identified a workable model for these phases and is ready to expand implementation across the force.
The next step—arguably the most complex—is the development of a new model for joint operations training, integrating the army, navy, air force, rocket force, and other elements into a unified operational framework.
A transition toward joint warfighting capability
Reports released by official PLA media in January 2026 indicate that units across the armed forces are now intensifying experiments and pilot programs related to joint training models. This suggests that the PLA is entering a transitional phase in which it is testing and refining the mechanisms required for integrated operations.
From a longer-term perspective, the shift toward this stage likely began in the second half of 2025. If that is the case, the reduction in air and naval activity around Taiwan should not be interpreted as a sudden development but rather as the visible outcome of a trend that had already started months earlier.
The extremely low sortie counts recorded on some days since February may therefore represent an extreme manifestation of a longer-term adjustment, rather than a deliberate political signal.
Data that challenge alternative explanations
Several of the explanations currently circulating among observers appear inconsistent with available evidence.
One hypothesis links the drop in activity to the Two Sessions, China’s annual political meetings, during which the PLA sometimes reduces sensitive military operations. While such seasonal patterns do exist, the scale of the decline this year is unprecedented.
As of March 11, 2026, only two PLA aircraft sorties had been detected around Taiwan. During the same period in previous years, the numbers were significantly higher:
- 85 sorties in 2025
- 113 sorties in 2024
- 134 sorties in 2023
A reduction of this magnitude cannot easily be explained by political scheduling alone.
Another theory suggests that Beijing may be lowering military pressure ahead of a potential Trump–Xi meeting. Yet if that were the case, one would expect a reduction in other military indicators as well—particularly naval deployments.
Instead, PLA naval presence around Taiwan has remained largely stable. As of March 11, the number of PLA naval vessels detected around the island stood at:
- 61 in 2026
- 65 in 2025
- 61 in 2024
- 37 in 2023
In other words, naval activity has not declined in a way that would indicate a deliberate effort to reduce military pressure.
Operational readiness appears intact
A third explanation attributes the drop in sorties to the recent purges within the PLA leadership, which have affected several senior officers in recent years. However, patterns in joint combat readiness patrols do not support the idea of a significant degradation in military capability.
Between January 1 and March 11, 2026, the PLA conducted seven joint combat readiness patrols, compared with nine in 2025 and seven in 2024—a broadly consistent frequency.
Moreover, a patrol conducted on February 13, 2026, involved 42 aircraft sorties and 11 naval vessels, placing it among the largest operations carried out in the past two years. If the PLA’s combat readiness had been significantly affected, both the frequency and scale of these patrols would likely have declined.
A structural shift rather than a political signal
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the recent decline in aircraft sorties around Taiwan should not be interpreted primarily as a political signal or as a reduction in China’s military pressure on the island.
Instead, it may reflect a structural transition within the PLA, as the Chinese military seeks to develop a more advanced model of joint warfighting capability.
If this interpretation is correct, the most important takeaway is not the temporary drop in air activity itself, but the fact that the PLA appears to be investing heavily in building an integrated operational framework across its services—a capability widely considered essential in any potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait.
