This article is an English adaptation of an analysis written by Emanuele Rossi and published on Formiche.net.
The most compelling and concerning speculation regarding the Houthis’ destabilization of the Indo-Mediterranean geoeconomic corridor, stretching from Suez to the Arabian Sea, is as follows: the Yemeni rebels are acting under the guidance of external actors who have capitalized on the situation to disrupt traditional Euro-Asian connectivity and establish an alternative route. These actors are not limited to their Iranian backers but potentially include Russia and China, who have allegedly exploited the instability to promote, in concert, the development of the Northern Sea Route.
In this view, the Houthis have been instrumentalized by revisionist powers to advance a broader plan aimed at restructuring globalization. The theory finds some grounding in the fact that both Russia and China, along with Iran to a lesser extent, are positioning themselves as champions of efforts to revise the current global governance architecture — and by extension, the geoeconomic frameworks that span the planet. Professor Steve Tsang (SOAS) has provided an analysis in these pages on Xi Jinping’s thinking regarding this strategic vision.
A northern, Arctic route would allow Russia to exert territorial control over a significant portion of the passage, while enabling China to bypass critical Indo-Pacific chokepoints, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Taiwan Strait, as well as the bottlenecks of the Indo-Mediterranean corridor. In the long term, the Arctic route — which would also leverage the melting ice caps due to global warming — could become the main artery for Europe-Asia trade, proving especially advantageous for Northern European manufacturing hubs. In this context, the Sino-Russian strategy may intersect with the interests of EU countries like Germany and the Netherlands, positioned at an intermediate distance. The southern route, by contrast, could be relegated to secondary status, serving primarily regional needs. This would afford Iran greater control over it, while China continues to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean — a development that has also prompted the U.S. to increase its own activities in the region.
While this narrative is compelling, there is no concrete evidence to support it beyond analytical speculation. Neither Russia nor China has made public statements about such a plan, and they are unlikely to do so — nor are the Houthis. Yet the allure of the theory persists. The Houthis have consistently claimed that their operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are meant to express solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, devastated by the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. However, it is well understood that this justification is only partial; in reality, the former rebels, now in control of much of Yemen, are also seeking to demonstrate their strength in the negotiations that will shape the future of the country, which they would prefer to see divided so they can retain control over the northern portion.
Recently, U.S. Fifth Fleet Commander, Admiral George Wikoff, who oversees American naval forces in the Middle East, publicly dismissed the notion that the Houthis are acting purely out of solidarity with the Palestinians, pointing out that the terrorist group is “a weapon in search of a reason to use it” (implicitly “in someone’s hands”). Wikoff also noted that Iran’s arms supply to the Houthis warrants further scrutiny: “There is a new supply line we are monitoring, among the various supply lines reaching the Houthis, and we do not believe these operations are solely limited to the Iranians.”
It is plausible that the Houthis may already possess Chinese-made weapons, but this does not necessarily imply that China is using the Houthis for its own strategic purposes, as the arms could have reached Yemen through various trafficking channels. Additionally, there have been reports since the beginning of the month suggesting the presence of Russian GRU special units in Yemen, assisting the Yemeni forces: Is this the realization of a larger plan? It is also true that both Moscow and Beijing could be exploiting the destabilization in an anti-Western capacity, for instance, by accusing the U.S. and EU of being the cause due to their support for Israel. This would represent a tactical adaptation of a broader strategic narrative. But is exploiting the narrative context enough to link the events in the Indo-Mediterranean to a larger plan, such as the construction of Sino-Russian supply chains in the Arctic?
An unclassified report published in June by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency indicated that container traffic in the Indo-Mediterranean region had plummeted by 90% between December 2023 and mid-February 2024. While traffic has resumed, it remains limited, as neither European defensive measures nor Anglo-American military interventions have been sufficient to halt the Yemeni forces. Moreover, the risk of an environmental disaster has grown, and there has been an uptick in propagandistic coordination between the Houthis and Hezbollah. In this sense, globalization has already been affected, as the market is showing resilience by attempting to normalize the deviation caused by shipping companies rerouting their cargo around the Cape of Good Hope, at greater expense, to avoid the Houthis.
Now there is an additional factor: while the Indo-Mediterranean route is losing significance, the so-called “Arctic Route” is becoming increasingly viable. However, this could be merely coincidental, as Russia’s Arctic project has been in development for years, complete with a specially prepared fleet. For instance, who can forget Vladimir Putin’s reaction to the Suez blockage caused by the Ever Given? Recently, the NewNew Star container ship became the largest non-icebreaker vessel to transit the Arctic. This is emblematic of the broader efforts by China and Russia to capitalize on northern maritime routes. The vessel, owned by Hong Kong’s Yangpu NewNew Shipping, transported 3,534 TEUs from Nansha, a port in Guangdong, to St. Petersburg. As the shipping company considers launching seasonal services with larger vessels, other significant ships are also traversing these routes. The Xin Xin Hai 1 is completing an eastward voyage destined for Rizhao in Shandong, while the Xin Xin Hai 2 is wrapping up its second transit — escorted by a Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker — linking Arkhangelsk with Tianjin.
