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The Iran Pakistan gas pipeline that has increased tensions.
The Iran Pakistan gas pipeline that has increased tensions.

Iran has recently informed the Pakistani government that it intends to bring Islamabad before an arbitration court in Paris this month for failing to comply with the agreement related to the construction of its part of a cross-border gas pipeline. The project has been delayed for over 10 years, primarily due to Islamabad’s concerns over potential U.S. sanctions.

The project, born from an initial agreement in 2009, has become emblematic of Pakistan’s geopolitical and economic struggles, highlighting how these can hinder the country’s national interests. Supporters of the pipeline in Pakistan argue that it could ensure a steady energy supply, at a lower cost compared to imported oil, to address the chronic energy shortage. It is expected that Pakistan will deplete its gas reserves within 12 years, and according to Iran, the pipeline could provide between 750 million and 1 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day.

While Iran completed its part of the 1,100 km pipeline in 2012, Pakistan has yet to begin construction on its 780 km section. In February, Islamabad committed to building the first 80 km, but it has yet to even acquire the necessary land. Pakistan has long feared compromising relations with Saudi Arabia, a strategic ally and rival of Iran, in addition to the risk of sanctions from the U.S., a key trade partner and provider of economic aid. This has slowed progress on the project. Some of Pakistan’s concerns may have eased following last year’s reconciliation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but U.S.-Iran tensions have worsened due to instability in the Middle East, which is troubling for Islamabad, already seen as overly aligned with Beijing in Washington’s eyes. This makes a U.S. sanctions waiver unlikely, and Islamabad has not yet formally requested one. U.S. officials have expressed opposition to the pipeline project this year, warning of the risk of sanctions.

Some governments close to Washington manage to do business with Tehran without facing negative consequences, such as India, which is developing a port in Iran. However, Pakistan is constrained by its geopolitical and economic status: it cannot afford to jeopardize relations with its main partners, having relatively few allies. Moreover, its limited global influence means it is unlikely to secure concessions like sanctions waivers.

Pakistan’s economic vulnerabilities make it heavily dependent on external sources of financing, such as the International Monetary Fund, and it cannot risk jeopardizing access to such resources. Islamabad can only dream of the foreign policy autonomy enjoyed by India, a central player on the global stage with fewer economic dependencies, which (due to its status) has greater capacity to navigate the difficult terrain of sanctions.

These limitations also prevent Pakistan from securing external funding for the pipeline. The country has few capital-rich partners willing to overlook the risks of U.S. sanctions. China, due to economic and security concerns, is reluctant to make new investments in Pakistan, while Russia, which began selling oil to Pakistan last year, faces economic problems related to its war in Ukraine—and has no interest in financing a project that would reduce its commercial weight.

However, for Pakistan, withdrawing from the project carries significant risks. In a worst-case scenario, Islamabad could be forced to pay up to $18 billion for failing to complete the project. In recent days, the Pakistani government has stated that negotiations with Tehran are ongoing to find a workable solution.

In the future, Islamabad may reopen talks with Tehran if U.S. sanctions fears subside. For now, the pipeline project serves as a lesson for Pakistan: it is not possible to strengthen energy security by undertaking projects beyond its capabilities, as explained by Michael Kugelman in his South Asia Brief. The issue is significant because Iran and Pakistan have previously vented mutual tensions militarily. For Tehran, the business could be economically crucial—and the Islamic Republic desperately needs to increase revenues given the disastrous economic condition to which the regime has led the country.