GRU, Russias military intelligence is now in Yemen helping Iran backed Houthis with regional influence projects and a geo-strategic approach stretching from the Indo-Mediterranean to the Arctic writes Emanuele Rossi for Formiche.net.

Russian military intelligence, GRU (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation still known by its former acronym GRU), is in Yemen, present with military advisors alongside the Houthis in Yemen reports the Middle East Eye, a UK-based site specialising in the region, via an anonymous US official citing US intelligence. If confirmed, this would change the perception of the activities of Ansar Allah (Houthis), the Yemeni separatist militia, and it is linked—although strategically even more significant—to the New York Times’ revelations about the deployment of Russian weapons (mainly for air defense) in Iran.

The Houthis, who since last November have launched a series of attacks against maritime traffic along the Indo-Mediterranean routes of the Red Sea, claim to be fighting in retaliation for the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip—the same war that, if and when Tehran launches a punitive attack following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, could expand regionally and make Russian air defenses important for protecting the Islamic Republic from Israeli counter-reaction. The presence of the GRU in Yemen might also be opportunistic.

Staying on Yemen: it is well-known that the Houthis are probably not genuinely defending their “Palestinian brothers,” but are instead exploiting the situation to assert, by force, a prominent position at the negotiating table that will discuss the country’s future—one that has been ravaged by a separatist war initiated by the Houthis for over a decade.

Now, if the GRU experts are alongside them, it means that the scenario is expanding. At the very least, it becomes clear that Moscow is working for destabilization and thus has an interest in maintaining it until it finds it useful to do the opposite. Why? There are various tactical and strategic reasons.

Firstly, being present allows Russia to have a role, albeit a minor one, in Yemen’s future. This means being there for reconstruction contracts, but also (and more importantly) participating in discussions on a crucial dossier for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is Russia’s most important competitor in the oil sector, and while public forms of contact—such as institutional dialogue through the OPEC+ system—are fine, Moscow knows that keeping other, less formal and sharper levers can be useful. Moreover, in June, there were talks of a possible sale of Russian missiles to the Yemenis, which was reportedly stopped by the direct intervention of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It is also worth noting that Russia’s top Middle East policy expert, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, met with a Houthi delegation led by the group’s spokesman, Mohamed Abdel Salam, in Moscow in July.

The Americans believe that Russia’s intent is also to use support for the Houthis as leverage, once again, against the West’s support for invaded Ukraine. Therefore, it is necessary to widen the perspective beyond the Arabian Peninsula, as Russian military intelligence units (specialized in both the use of weapons and gray zone operations and cognitive warfare activities) are reportedly in Yemen according to a logic of direct and indirect interests against the West.

Regarding the direct interests: it is known that Moscow has sought some form of agreement with the Houthis to safeguard Russian ships from attacks (something the Chinese have also reportedly sought, by the way). This was supposed to ensure safe passage, but sometimes Yemeni targeting is anything but precise: the GRU could help choose the targets more carefully. That is, it could help the Houthis ensure that Russian shipments have a competitive advantage on the Europe-Asia route compared to those of the United States, Europe, the United Kingdom, or Israel (which would instead be in the crosshairs).

This is no small matter in the context of the ongoing and growing competition that Russia and other revisionist nations are engaging in against the current model of international affairs governance. It is this same model that led to the launch of the European “Aspides” mission and the US-led “Prosperity Shield” and “Poseidon Archer” missions. If the Russians were to find some form of management of the situation, then the Kremlin could market it as an effective and efficient solution to a crisis—where the US and EU have failed, over all these months, to find a way to control a destabilization that has already caused a partial upheaval in the global geo-economy.

This leads to geoeconomics. Russia has long been working to increase its presence within the global supply chain system, but despite its vast territorial extent, it is quite marginalized, except for specific connections (such as to Central Asia). This is even more so when considering the now enormous Chinese influence on the Eurasian route, which forms the Belt & Road Initiative. However, thanks to a series of factors, the most important being global warming—and the consequent melting of polar ice—Moscow could become central again if an Arctic route were to open.

There is currently no comparison between the acquired (and still potential) centrality of Suez, that is, the Indo-Mediterranean corridor that ascends Bab el Mandeb along the Red Sea, and the one under construction that is expected to pass through the Gulf, known by the acronym “IMEC.” However, showing weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Indo-Mediterranean, in general its instability, can already be useful now to continue to argue that having most supply chains passing through that Europe-Asia geostrategic context is no longer functional.

After all, when the cargo ship Ever Given got stuck in Suez, blocking the Canal for days in 2021, Vladimir Putin did not suggest the most direct solution—circumnavigating Africa, which has now become a normal route with the Houthi destabilization. Rather, the Russian president emphasized that the event confirmed the need to accelerate the Arctic route projects—where Russia is preparing to dominate the passage.