- Fincantieri at the core: the FREMM deal strengthens Italy’s role in Greece’s naval modernisation, from the platform itself to long-term industrial support.
- A stronger Hellenic Navy: the two frigates boost Athens’ capabilities in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, while reinforcing NATO and EU maritime security.
- Indo-Mediterranean value: a more capable Greek fleet strengthens the strategic maritime continuum linking the Mediterranean, Suez, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The agreement between Italy and Greece for the transfer of two Bergamini-class FREMM frigates is more than a bilateral defence transaction. It strengthens one of NATO’s most strategically positioned navies, gives Fincantieri a central role in the next phase of Greek naval modernisation, and adds capacity along a maritime space that increasingly connects security in the Mediterranean with developments stretching towards the Red Sea and the Indo-Pacific.
Rome and Athens are finalising the legal, financial and technical framework for the transfer of the Carlo Bergamini and Virginio Fasan, currently serving with the Italian Navy. The first is scheduled to enter Greek service in the first half of 2028, with the second following in the first half of 2029. The arrangement also covers initial and follow-on support and provides for Greek industrial participation, including the involvement of domestic shipyards in maintenance and the integration of new systems.
For Athens, the significance is immediate. The FREMMs will join a fleet already undergoing substantial renewal through four FDI frigates and the modernisation of the MEKO class. Greece’s Defence Ministry explicitly describes the resulting force as one built around high-capability strike units for operations in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
But the implications extend beyond Greek fleet numbers.
Fincantieri’s role goes beyond the transfer
At the industrial level, the agreement puts Fincantieri in a particularly important position. The Italian group is not simply the builder behind the FREMM platform. It represents the industrial continuity that can connect the transfer of existing vessels with their support, adaptation and potential future evolution.
That dimension was already visible when Athens and Rome signed their initial declaration of intent in September 2025. Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias said at the time that Greece would engage with Fincantieri over possible improvements to the ships, including the integration of additional capabilities. The original framework also contemplated a “2+2” formula, leaving open the possibility of two further vessels.
This matters because modern naval exports are increasingly about ecosystems rather than hulls. Maintenance, upgrades, combat-system integration and through-life support can create industrial relationships lasting decades. Fincantieri already operates inside precisely this model on the Italian FREMM fleet: through Orizzonte Sistemi Navali, its 51-49 joint venture with Leonardo, it participates in the long-term support architecture for the class.
The Greek arrangement can therefore become an industrial bridge between the two countries. Athens gains access to a mature European naval platform and associated expertise, while Greek shipyards are brought into maintenance and adaptation work. Italy, meanwhile, strengthens the international footprint of a naval industrial base that is simultaneously moving towards the next-generation FREMM EVO.
That transition is important. Italy is not simply disposing of ageing assets. Its own fleet renewal allows existing high-end vessels to be transferred to an allied navy while Italian industry moves ahead with more advanced units. Fincantieri and Leonardo’s Orizzonte Sistemi Navali is already contracted to build two FREMM EVO frigates for the Italian Navy, with enhanced command-and-control, anti-drone and unmanned-system capabilities.
The result is a form of allied fleet regeneration: Italy renews its force while valuable existing platforms remain inside the European and NATO security architecture.
A stronger Hellenic Navy matters beyond the Aegean
For Greece, the acquisition adds another layer to a naval build-up whose relevance cannot be confined to the country’s immediate disputes or to the Aegean.
Geography makes the Hellenic Navy an important actor at the intersection of several maritime theatres. The Eastern Mediterranean connects Europe to the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, while instability further east has demonstrated how quickly disruptions in one maritime region can affect security, trade and naval deployments in another.
This is where the Indo-Mediterranean dimension of the FREMM agreement becomes significant.
The “Indo-Mediterranean” should not be understood as a new formal theatre or alliance structure. It is better understood as a strategic continuum: the sea lanes running from the Mediterranean through Suez and the Red Sea towards the Indian Ocean carry energy, commercial flows and military traffic whose security cannot easily be divided into separate regional compartments.
Strengthening the Greek fleet consequently adds capable European naval mass near the western end of that continuum.
The FREMMs are particularly relevant because they are multi-mission platforms rather than vessels optimised for a single task. Their value lies in the ability to contribute to different missions — from anti-submarine and surface warfare to air defence, maritime surveillance and the protection of sea lines of communication — according to configuration and operational requirements.
A Hellenic Navy combining FREMMs, new FDI frigates and modernised MEKOs will therefore have greater capacity not only to defend Greek waters, but also to contribute sophisticated assets to allied maritime operations.
From ship sale to maritime security architecture
For Italy, that may ultimately be the most important strategic return from the agreement.
Rome does not need to operate every additional ship itself for Italian interests to benefit from a stronger allied naval presence. A more capable Greek fleet strengthens a NATO and EU partner located at the centre of the Eastern Mediterranean, at a time when European navies face simultaneous demands ranging from monitoring Russian activity to protecting critical infrastructure and keeping maritime routes open.
The arrangement also demonstrates what European defence cooperation can look like when operational and industrial interests reinforce each other. Existing Italian capabilities are transferred rather than lost to the wider allied system; Greek naval capacity grows; domestic Greek industry participates; and Fincantieri remains positioned around the platform throughout its next operational life.
There is also a broader signal for the Italian shipbuilding industry. Fincantieri is increasingly pursuing international opportunities for FREMM and other naval platforms, while the Italian FREMM family itself continues to evolve. The Greek agreement gives further evidence that Italy’s naval industrial base can function as an instrument of defence partnership, rather than merely as an exporter of individual ships.
For Athens, the gain is measured in additional high-end hulls and a faster route towards fleet renewal. For Rome, it is measured in industrial influence and a more capable maritime partner. For the wider alliance, the value lies in where those ships will operate.
The transfer of two frigates cannot by itself reshape the naval balance from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. But it does reinforce the European end of a maritime corridor whose security is becoming harder to compartmentalise. In that sense, keeping two capable FREMMs at sea under the flag of an allied Greece is strategically more consequential than a conventional second-hand warship sale would suggest.
