- Jaish-e-Mohammad facilities damaged during Operation Sindoor are being rebuilt, raising fresh questions about Pakistan’s counterterrorism credibility.
- Islamabad continues fighting the TTP internally while still facing accusations of tolerating anti-India militant groups seen as strategically useful.
- The reconstruction efforts risk undermining Pakistan’s international credibility on terrorism financing and militant containment.
The satellite imagery showing the reconstruction of Jaish-e-Mohammad infrastructure in Bahawalpur and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir is not simply evidence of a militant group recovering after India’s Operation Sindoor strikes. It also offers a window into a much deeper and more structural problem that has shaped Pakistan for decades: the unresolved and often ambiguous relationship between the state, the military establishment, and militant networks.
The rebuilding of the Jamia Subhan Allah compound — the historic headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammad led by UN-designated terrorist Masood Azhar — therefore becomes more than a story about terrorism. It becomes a proxy for understanding the broader crisis of Pakistan’s security architecture.
At the core of the issue lies one of Pakistan’s longest-standing strategic contradictions. For years, parts of the Pakistani security establishment differentiated between militant groups considered useful to national strategic interests and those viewed as direct threats to the state. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani network, and Jaish-e-Mohammad were widely seen by Indian and Western analysts as instruments linked to Pakistan’s regional posture, particularly in Kashmir and Afghanistan. At the same time, Islamabad fought an increasingly violent insurgency against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban.
Over time, however, that distinction has become increasingly unsustainable.
As highlighted in a recent Council on Foreign Relations analysis, the TTP is now significantly stronger than it was only a few years ago, largely because of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021. Islamabad had long believed that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would provide strategic depth and greater regional leverage. Instead, the opposite largely occurred. The Afghan Taliban has provided sanctuary and operational space to the TTP, which has intensified attacks against Pakistani security forces while exploiting the porous border between the two countries.
The result is a deeply paradoxical security environment for Pakistan. On one side, Islamabad continues to face accusations of tolerating or selectively targeting anti-India militant groups. On the other, it is confronting a growing internal jihadist insurgency that directly threatens the Pakistani state itself.
The recent escalation with Afghanistan illustrates this dynamic clearly. Pakistan’s February strikes against Taliban-linked targets in Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia marked one of the most direct confrontations between the two governments since the Taliban returned to power. Islamabad openly accuses Kabul of harboring TTP militants, while the Taliban denies the allegations and condemns Pakistani cross-border operations.
Within this broader context, the reconstruction of Jaish facilities carries significance well beyond the organization itself. It highlights the structural limitations of Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of selectively managing militancy. For decades, Islamabad attempted to separate “manageable” militant actors from anti-state extremists. But overlapping ideological ecosystems, tribal linkages, operational cooperation, and decades of radicalization have made such compartmentalization increasingly fragile.
At the same time, Pakistan is navigating one of the most severe internal crises in its modern history. Political polarization following the removal of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the growing dominance of the military establishment, record inflation, IMF dependency, unemployment, and mounting social unrest have all weakened state capacity.
Meanwhile, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) continues to monitor Pakistan’s counterterrorism financing mechanisms despite the country’s removal from the grey list in 2022. Reports that Jaish-linked accounts may have used digital wallets and online fundraising mechanisms to support reconstruction efforts risk reviving international scrutiny over Pakistan’s actual enforcement capabilities — and intentions.
From India’s perspective, these developments reinforce a strategic conclusion that has become deeply entrenched in New Delhi after years of cross-border attacks: militant infrastructure inside Pakistan is not an isolated or residual phenomenon, but rather part of a broader ecosystem that has never been fully dismantled. This perception continues to shape India’s doctrine of preemptive deterrence, including operations such as Sindoor.
The implications extend well beyond India-Pakistan relations. A politically unstable, economically fragile, and internally fragmented Pakistan facing multiple militant threats simultaneously poses broader regional and international security concerns. For the United States, India, and Western partners, the issue is no longer limited to the survival of groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad or the TTP. The deeper concern is the gradual erosion of state authority inside a nuclear-armed country of more than 240 million people, creating larger operational space for extremist actors in one of the world’s most strategically sensitive regions.
