- Shared Security Vision: India sees the Aqaba Process as aligning with its own holistic approach to counterterrorism — combining security, prevention, and development rather than relying solely on military force.
- Indo-Mediterranean Stability: The initiative’s focus on Africa and the Sahel connects directly to India’s Indo-Mediterranean vision: safeguarding maritime routes, energy security, and regional stability amid jihadist and proxy threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.
- Global South Leadership: By engaging with processes like Aqaba, India strengthens its role as a responsible actor in the Global South, promoting equal partnerships and resilience against extremist networks, disinformation, and hybrid threats across Africa and the wider region.
The Rome meeting of the Aqaba Process, co-chaired by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Jordan’s King Abdullah II, offers an instructive lens for India’s strategic outlook. Established in 2015 as an informal platform against terrorism and violent extremism, the Jordanian initiative has evolved into a discreet but influential network of cooperation among governments, security officials, international organizations, and private actors. Its 2025 focus on the Sahel and West Africa underscores a central idea India shares: security must be treated as a collective, interregional good.
In recent years, New Delhi has adopted an increasingly global conception of security that extends far beyond South Asia. India has long fought terrorism—both domestically and across borders—and sees the spread of jihadist violence in Africa and the Middle East as an indirect but tangible threat to its own stability. The same ideological ecosystem that fuels militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed also sustains organizations operating across the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Levant. The convergence of terrorism, criminal networks, and illicit trade along the corridors linking Africa, the Gulf, and South Asia confirms that no region can isolate itself from this challenge.
From India’s perspective, the Aqaba Process is more than a regional forum: it is a potential multiplier of stability across the “Indo-Mediterranean,” the strategic continuum linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean basin. This space has become a key arena for crises that directly affect Indian interests. The war in Gaza and the terrorism of Hamas—backed by Hezbollah and the Houthis—have disrupted freedom of navigation and threatened energy security, two core priorities for India as a major importer of hydrocarbons from the Middle East.
Italy and Jordan’s joint approach—integrating security, prevention, and economic development—resonates with India’s own “Security and Growth for All in the Region” (SAGAR) vision. Both frameworks emphasize informal cooperation, intelligence sharing, and the need to address the structural roots of instability. Rome’s Mattei Plan, based on equal partnerships with African nations, mirrors India’s developmental engagement on the continent—driven by infrastructure, training, and concessional finance rather than extractive or militarized approaches.
Africa, in India’s worldview, is emerging as a central theater for its soft-power diplomacy within the Global South. From counterterrorism and food security to digital connectivity and supply chain resilience, New Delhi’s engagement reflects a long-term vision of partnership. Yet the deterioration of security in the Sahel—marked by the rise of ISIS affiliates and al-Shabaab—directly undermines that vision. Moreover, the expanding presence of Russia’s Afrika Corps and China’s growing influence across Africa complicate India’s pursuit of a multipolar order grounded in strategic autonomy and responsible cooperation.
Against this backdrop, the Aqaba Process represents a model India can relate to: a flexible, non-ideological mechanism that connects regional and global actors around a shared objective—collective security. India’s deepening interest in the Mediterranean and Africa is no longer purely economic; it reflects an understanding that stability from the Indian Ocean to North Africa underpins its maritime and strategic identity.
The fight against extremism is no longer confined by geography. With its long experience in confronting jihadist networks and its growing role in multilateral diplomacy, India could emerge as a natural partner for initiatives like Aqaba. Rome, Amman, and New Delhi now share a common intuition: security cannot be guaranteed by military means alone—it must be built through pragmatic partnerships that integrate defense, development, and dialogue.
