- India’s potential BrahMos sale to Indonesia could signal a broader regional trend, following the Philippines’ acquisition of the missile system.
- New Delhi is emerging as a security provider without relying on formal alliances, using defence exports and strategic partnerships to expand its Indo-Pacific role.
- A loose “BrahMos network” could strengthen Southeast Asian deterrence against China while allowing regional countries to preserve their strategic autonomy.
India’s potential sale of BrahMos missiles to Indonesia would be more than another defence export deal. It could mark the emergence of a new security architecture in Southeast Asia — one built not around formal alliances, but around increasingly capable networks of deterrence.
The Philippines became the first foreign customer of the India-Russia-developed supersonic cruise missile, receiving its first systems in 2024. If Indonesia follows, what initially looked like an isolated commercial success could begin to resemble a broader strategic pattern.
For New Delhi, the implications are significant. India has long presented itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, but defence exports are giving that ambition a new dimension.
Rather than replicating the US-led alliance system, India is developing security partnerships through arms sales, military training, maritime domain awareness and industrial cooperation.
The BrahMos fits particularly well into this approach.
For Southeast Asian countries concerned about China’s growing maritime power but reluctant to enter formal alliances, acquiring advanced anti-ship capabilities offers a politically flexible way to strengthen deterrence. India, meanwhile, can expand its strategic footprint without forcing partners to choose sides. This is where the potential Indonesian deal becomes important.
The Philippines and Indonesia occupy crucial positions along the maritime geography connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. The deployment of BrahMos systems across Southeast Asia would complicate the strategic environment for any navy operating in the region and gradually strengthen the ability of regional states to protect key maritime approaches.
The result could be the emergence of what might be called a “BrahMos network”: not an alliance, and certainly not an India-led security bloc, but a loose geography of countries acquiring similar capabilities and deepening defence relations with New Delhi. Such a development would also reveal something broader about India’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
While Washington relies heavily on alliances and China combines economic influence with an expanding military presence, India is experimenting with a different model: strategic partnerships without formal alignment.
Defence exports could become one of its most effective instruments.
The real significance of BrahMos, therefore, may lie beyond the missile itself. If more Southeast Asian countries follow the Philippines and Indonesia, India could quietly become an increasingly important supplier of deterrence across the Indo-Pacific.
And in a region where governments want greater security without sacrificing strategic autonomy, that may prove to be precisely the kind of partnership many countries are looking for.
