- Asymmetric Progress: IMEC is advancing unevenly—India’s maritime links with the Gulf are moving forward under its Look West Policy, while the central land segment through the Middle East is stalled due to regional instability. Europe’s role is emerging, with Italy, France, and Greece proposing key terminal ports.
- Italy’s Strategic Positioning: Italy aims to anchor IMEC within a broader national strategy, offering Trieste as a gateway to Central Europe. The appointment of a special envoy and an upcoming high-level visit to India highlight Rome’s diplomatic engagement.
- Global Synergies: IMEC increasingly aligns with the Mattei Plan for Africa and the EU’s Global Gateway. Its connectivity with East Africa, the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and even Australia underscores the corridor’s potential as a pillar of global trade resilience and geopolitical influence.
Eighteen months after its announcement, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is now in development, though the three main segments of the project are advancing at markedly different speeds.
As Tiziano Marino of the Center for International Studies (CeSI) analyzed, with Alexandru Fordea, the eastern leg—aimed at strengthening maritime links between India and the Middle East—has made notable progress. This momentum is largely driven by India’s Look West Policy, which seeks to deepen strategic partnerships with regional players, particularly in the Gulf. “New Delhi is investing heavily in port infrastructure and the broader maritime sector,” Marino notes, often working closely with key actors such as UAE-based DP World.
Conversely, the central segment—linking the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel by land—remains stalled, awaiting a long-term political solution to the region’s ongoing instability. “The success of this corridor hinges in particular on the Israel-Palestine-Jordan triangle and the normalization of relations between Tel Aviv and Riyadh,” Marino explains. He points to upcoming high-level talks in Washington between Israeli and U.S. leaders, as well as parallel discussions set to begin in Oman between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as potential turning points. “Diplomatic engagement must be sustained not only by direct stakeholders but also by all parties with a vested interest in IMEC’s realization,” Marino adds.
While the Middle East awaits greater stability, the Indo-Mediterranean link could be accelerated via traditional maritime routes. This, according to Marino, underscores the project’s non-confrontational nature and its strategic objective: “to diversify commercial routes and enhance the resilience of global supply chains in a period marked by severe geopolitical turbulence.”
Italy has begun to assert a strategic posture within IMEC, wrote Marino, recently appointing Ambassador Francesco Talò as its special envoy for the initiative. Rome’s approach — He argued — hinges on strengthening ties with India and Gulf partners. A milestone in this trajectory will be the upcoming visit to India by Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, who will lead a delegation of firms to the India-Italy Business, Science and Technology Forum.
According to CeSI’s expert, from Rome’s perspective, IMEC could be integrated into a broader national grand strategy. The candidacy of Trieste as a terminal port connects Italy directly to Germany and other Central and Eastern European markets. “This would create a natural link to the Three Seas Initiative, forming a trade corridor from the Indian Ocean to the Baltic,” Marino writes. He points out the growing synergy with Poland—India’s strategic partner since summer 2024—and suggests that Italy could align with Germany’s Focus on India strategy (October 2024), potentially becoming Berlin’s access point to the Indian Ocean.
The Balkans also enter the picture, with India’s recent opening of an honorary consulate in Albania signaling possible regional expansion. Marino argues that this could enhance IMEC’s scope in areas of strong Italian interest.
Crucially, there is increasing complementarity between IMEC and Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa. Countries such as Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania—central to the Mattei Plan—could help link Indo-Mediterranean priorities with Rome’s African cooperation strategy. Infrastructure projects within IMEC, such as undersea fiber cables and green hydrogen networks, align closely with Italian initiatives on energy and digital connectivity.
The European Commission has acknowledged this alignment, tying both IMEC and the Mattei Plan to the broader Global Gateway initiative and, by extension, the European Economic Security Strategy. During a recent visit to India, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen explicitly linked IMEC’s rail connections to EU diversification efforts. Meanwhile, the European Parliament recognized the strategic value of the Mattei Plan through an amendment on macro-financial aid to Egypt.
India, for its part, is also expanding its African presence as part of its bid to lead the so-called Global South. Marino notes that “Italy and India could coordinate their visions for Africa,” leveraging complementary efforts through corridors like Lobito and shared partnerships across the continent—potentially opening access to the Atlantic over time.
Looking east, Italy’s strengthening ties with Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, reinforce its position within IMEC. From Indian ports, the corridor could extend into the Bay of Bengal under India’s Act East Policy, linking to Southeast Asia and even Australia. Marino highlights that EU–Australia FTA talks are poised to resume, potentially forming another pillar to reinforce the corridor and buffer against global trade instability.
In conclusion, Marino argues that this is a defining moment for IMEC. “Embedding the corridor within a broader strategic framework will be essential for any country seeking to harness its full potential—and Italy is well-positioned to do just that.”
