- Renewed U.S. Focus on Strategic Partnerships: Trump 2.0 is expected to strengthen alliances in Southeast Asia, with the Philippines and Vietnam benefiting most from increased defense cooperation against China’s claims in the South China Sea.
- A Transactional Approach Welcomed by Authoritarian Regime: Trump’s focus on national interests over values may appeal to authoritarian governments like Cambodia and Myanmar, fostering closer ties if strategic benefits prevail.
- Mixed Reactions to Intensified U.S.-China Rivalry: While countries like Malaysia and Indonesia remain cautious, others, such as Singapore, aim to balance the rivalry. Trump’s support for multilateral groups like AUKUS could challenge Beijing further.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 could significantly reshape U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia, a pivotal region in the intensifying competition between Washington and Beijing. According to Derek Grossman, a senior analyst at RAND Corporation, Trump’s likely policies may strengthen America’s strategic posture in the region but not without creating new tensions.
“From a broader perspective, it will be interesting to see how the incoming Trump administration handles the Biden administration’s legacy of using minilateral groups to achieve U.S. objectives in the region,” wrote Grossaman on a Foreign Policy analysis.
Whether it is the Australia-United Kingdom-United States pact (AUKUS), the so-called Squad (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States), or the United States-Japan-Philippines trilateral group, “Beijing views these collective security mechanisms as part of Washington’s attempts to contain it”.
“Given Trump’s renewed focus on great-power competition, he is likely to keep these groups intact and perhaps even create new ones,” he explained. “He did, after all, resuscitate the moribund Quad in 2017, suggesting that he is not averse to going beyond one-on-one dealmaking and finding multilateral solutions to challenges in the Indo-Pacific.”
On the one hand, Trump’s transactional approach, focused on advancing U.S. national interests while deprioritising democracy and human rights, might resonate with the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that dominate Southeast Asia. This values-free framework could facilitate deeper cooperation with countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, which have historically been criticised for systemic governance and human rights issues. On the other hand, such an approach risks exacerbating instability, particularly in flashpoints like the South China Sea.
Grossman highlights that the Philippines and Vietnam stand to benefit the most from a more assertive U.S. policy toward China. Both countries are on the frontlines of countering Beijing’s sweeping territorial claims in the South China Sea, which challenge international norms under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
The return of Trump to the White House could provide additional support to the Philippines in their efforts to push back against growing Chinese encroachments into their exclusive economic zone (EEZ), bolstering a more competitive U.S. strategy in the region.
Manila, under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has been deepening its defence alliance with Washington to counter China’s “grey zone” tactics around disputed maritime territories, including Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Trump’s willingness to sustain this partnership will be crucial, given the Philippines’ reliance on U.S. backing to deter further Chinese aggression.
Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam maintains a balanced relationship with Beijing and does not anticipate direct U.S. support for its maritime claims. However, Hanoi continues to benefit from U.S. military assistance, which aligns with its broader strategy of countering Chinese pressure while fostering economic ties with Washington. Although trade frictions arose during Trump’s first term—particularly allegations of currency manipulation—Grossman suggests the second Trump administration may prioritise strategic cooperation over trade disputes.
Brunei and Malaysia, maritime claimants in the South China Sea, will also likely benefit from U.S. support. However, Malaysia faces separate challenges, including the potential imposition of new trade tariffs and Trump’s strong backing of Israel, a stance that is unpopular in the Muslim-majority country. Malaysia’s support for Hamas further complicates its position, especially if Trump’s policies remain unchanged.
Not all Southeast Asian governments view heightened U.S.-China competition favourably. Indonesia and Singapore, for instance, prefer to maintain a delicate balance between the two powers. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto recently visited Beijing to bolster economic ties and address maritime disputes before travelling to Washington to strengthen military cooperation. Singapore, for its part, has expressed concerns over the destabilising effects of great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, though it remains committed to managing these tensions pragmatically.
Trump’s approach to multilateral mechanisms in the region could also have significant implications. Trump, despite his preference for bilateral dealmaking, revived support for the regional multilateral system U.S.-backed. These initiatives, perceived by Beijing as containment strategies, will likely remain central to U.S. policy under Trump’s renewed emphasis on great-power competition.
As Trump’s return looms, Southeast Asia faces a complex future. While some nations see opportunities to advance their strategic interests, others remain cautious about the risks posed by a more aggressive U.S.-China dynamic. For Beijing, Trump’s 2.0 presidency could signal a renewed challenge in its backyard.
