Latest Posts

South Korea’s AI ambitions are becoming an energy-security strategy – after war in Iran Xi in Egypt: what comes next Iran’s war is moving beyond the Indo-Mediterranean battlefield China’s J-16 deployment to Egypt signals a new reach for its air force
Turkish sailors set mooring lines aboard the Turkish Navy frigate TCG Fatih (F-242) shortly after pulling into port at Augusta Bay, June 2, 2014, during Phoenix Express 2014. Phoenix Express is an at-sea exercise designed to strengthen maritime partnerships and enhance stability through increased interoperability and cooperation among partners from Africa, Europe and North America. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Cameron Bramham, U.S. Navy/Released)

Turkey’s navy is increasingly positioning itself as a formidable force in global and regional security dynamics, also with a naval tactil/strategic presence in the Western Indian Ocean. This expansion reflects Turkey’s broader ambition to assert its influence over key maritime routes, energy corridors, and geopolitical flashpoints, extending its reach beyond the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. However, Turkey’s position in this region is complex and multifaceted, combining aspirational goals with significant limitations.

Turkey’s Unconventional Presence in the Indian Ocean

Despite being bordered by the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas, Turkey is not a natural maritime power – much more in the Indian Ocean. Yet, it aspires to become one, driven by its ambitions to be recognized as a truly global actor. The “Mavi Vatan” or “Blue Homeland” doctrine, first introduced in 2006, serves as the foundation of Turkey’s expanded maritime strategy. This doctrine claims a broader maritime jurisdiction for Turkey and has become a cornerstone of its naval and geopolitical aspirations. The annual “Blue Homeland” exercises, involving over 100 ships and aircraft in the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas, are a testament to Turkey’s desire to project power and assert its sovereignty in these waters.

Commercial and Opportunistic Motivations

While Turkey’s actions may appear strategic, much of its engagement in the Indian Ocean is driven by commercial interests rather than a grand strategic vision. The modernization of its defense sector, including the production of Bayraktar TB2 drones and other indigenous military assets, has enabled Turkey to engage with countries in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Defense sales and agreements, such as the maritime defense pact with Somalia and the sale of drones to the Maldives, are largely motivated by economic gains and the expansion of Turkey’s burgeoning defense industry, rather than a bid to become a dominant regional power.

Technological Advancements and Limitations

The commissioning of the first Reis-class submarine, the TCG Piri Reis, in 2023, as recently reported by the Erdogan-friendly Daily Sabah, marks a significant step in Turkey’s naval modernization efforts. This project, which includes six submarines with air-independent propulsion systems to be operational by 2029, underscores Turkey’s ambition to enhance its naval capabilities. However, the reality remains that Turkey’s resources are primarily focused on defending its homeland and immediate surroundings, rather than engaging in long-range power projection. Despite its advancements, the Turkish navy lacks the logistical and operational capacity for sustained deployments in distant regions like the Indian Ocean.

Strategic Presence in the Horn of Africa

Turkey’s involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia, is one of the clearest examples of its efforts to expand its influence in the region. Since 2013, the Turkish company Albayrak has operated and expanded the port of Mogadishu, and the military training facility in Mogadishu, opened in 2017, has trained thousands of Somali soldiers. These actions are part of a broader strategy to secure commercial and military footholds in strategically important locations, although the impact remains limited compared to other regional actors. The 2017 agreement with Sudan for the restoration of the Suakin Island outpost raised concerns about potential military use, highlighting the fine line Turkey treads between commercial and strategic interests.

Limitations and Constraints

Despite its ambitions, Turkey faces significant constraints in projecting power in the Indian Ocean. The Turkish navy’s capacity for far-reaching deployments is limited by its need to secure its own territorial waters and navigate complex regional challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. This restricts its ability to operate effectively in distant geographies, making its role in the Indian Ocean more opportunistic than strategic. Even the architect of the Mavi Vatan doctrine, Cem Gürdeniz, has acknowledged that Turkey’s presence in the Indian Ocean is primarily driven by business interests.

A Peripheral and Still Marginal Actor

Turkey’s robust naval expansion in the Western Indian Ocean represents a strategic effort to assert its influence and protect its interests in a critical maritime corridor. However, this expansion is characterized by a blend of strategic aspirations and commercial motivations, constrained by limited operational capacities. As Turkey continues to modernize its navy and seek influence in the Indian Ocean, its role is likely to remain peripheral compared to larger, more established powers. Despite its ambitions, Turkey’s current capabilities are insufficient for a significant and impactful presence in the region, leaving it as a secondary actor amid larger, more influential stakeholders. Nevertheless, Turkey’s actions are reshaping the region’s dynamics, and its evolving maritime doctrine reflects an ambition to play a more significant role in global geopolitics, even if its capabilities do not yet fully match its aspirations.

As argued in an analysis for ORF by Rushali Saha, an independent researcher based in New Delhi specializing in Indian Ocean geopolitics, and Brendon J. Cannon, Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University in Abu Dhabi, “Türkiye’s current outreach and aspirations in the Indian Ocean may be welcomed by some and decried by others, but they remain largely opportunistic rather than part of some grand strategy. For the near term, Türkiye will play a limited role in the Indian Ocean as a host of larger actors with greater stakes in the region address challenges and produce them, too.”