- Cooperative China (low probability): Beijing applies limited pressure on Iran to reopen Hormuz, mainly to stabilize markets and send a positive signal ahead of the Trump–Xi meeting. Likely symbolic, not decisive.
- Ambiguous China (most likely): China engages diplomatically and calls for de-escalation but avoids real pressure on Tehran, preserving its strategic ties with Iran while protecting its own energy interests.
- Resistant China (low–medium probability): Beijing refuses to cooperate or obstructs Western initiatives, framing U.S. pressure as strategic deflection and using the crisis as leverage in broader competition with Washington.
Washington has made public what had until now remained largely implicit: it wants China to use its leverage over Iran.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s call for Beijing to “step up with some diplomacy” and push Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz marks a clear shift—not only in substance, but in tone. The timing is equally significant. The appeal comes just days before the planned meeting between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where Iran will inevitably feature high on the agenda.
The U.S. argument is straightforward. If China purchases as much as 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, as Bessent suggested, then it also holds the economic leverage necessary to influence Tehran’s behavior. In this framing, Beijing is not merely a bystander—it is part of the problem, and potentially part of the solution.
Yet this is precisely where the analysis becomes more complex.
While Washington is publicly urging Chinese intervention, recent intelligence assessments point in a different direction. According to multiple sources, Beijing may be preparing to supply Iran with new air defense systems, potentially routed through third countries to preserve plausible deniability. If confirmed, this dual-track posture—quiet support combined with official neutrality—already defines the contours of China’s approach.
Against this backdrop, three broad scenarios emerge, though they do not carry equal weight.
The first is the one Washington hopes for: a cooperative China willing to exert meaningful pressure on Tehran to de-escalate and reopen Hormuz. Such a move could help stabilize global energy markets, protect China’s own economic interests, and contribute to a more constructive atmosphere ahead of the Trump–Xi summit. However, any overt alignment with U.S. demands would come at a significant strategic cost for Beijing, potentially undermining its positioning as an independent actor and a key partner for Iran.
A second, more plausible scenario is one of calibrated ambiguity. In this case, China would engage diplomatically with Iran, reiterate calls for de-escalation and freedom of navigation, and perhaps signal support for broader stability efforts—without applying coercive pressure or endorsing U.S. terms. This approach allows Beijing to preserve multiple priorities simultaneously: maintaining its strategic relationship with Iran, avoiding a prolonged disruption to energy flows, and resisting any perception of alignment with Washington.
This ambiguity is not simply a political choice; it reflects structural constraints. China’s dependence on discounted Iranian oil has been a critical component of its industrial model, even as broader disruptions in the Gulf now threaten a much larger share of its energy imports. Roughly half of China’s crude supply—and a significant portion of its LNG—flows through the Strait of Hormuz. In other words, Beijing has a direct interest in reopening the waterway, but not necessarily under conditions dictated by the United States.
A third scenario—less likely but strategically significant—is one in which China resists cooperation altogether, or even obstructs Western initiatives, including at the United Nations. In this reading, Washington’s public pressure could be interpreted as an attempt to shift responsibility onto Beijing, prompting a more defensive and transactional response. In the context of systemic rivalry, the Iran crisis would then become another arena for strategic competition rather than coordination.
Complicating matters further is a frequently overlooked factor: the limits of China’s influence over Iran. Despite deep economic ties, Tehran retains a high degree of strategic autonomy, particularly on issues such as the Strait of Hormuz, where decisions are driven by national security calculations rather than external economic pressure.
Ultimately, the U.S. request reflects both an operational need and a broader narrative strategy—highlighting China’s economic ties to Iran while implicitly assigning it a share of responsibility for regional stability. Yet this very framing reduces the likelihood of full Chinese cooperation.
As the Trump–Xi meeting approaches, limited signals of engagement from Beijing are likely. But a substantive shift in China’s posture remains unlikely. Beijing has strong incentives to contain the crisis—but even stronger ones to do so on its own terms, and without appearing to align with Washington.
